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RESEARCH & DEBATE
REFLECTING ON FUCHIDA, OR “A TALE OF THREE WHOPPERS”
Jonathan Parshall
It is fitting that I first set pen to pixel for this article on 4 June 2009 (the sixty-
seventh anniversary of the battle of Midway), because Midway will forever be
tied to the name of Mitsuo Fuchida. As I write this, I confess to feeling a sense of
ambivalence. It is true that in this article I hope to bury Fuchida, not to praise
him. Yet it is equally true that as a student of the battle I would have loved to have
had a beer with him, too. Fuchida was, by all accounts, lively, intelligent, and
charismatic—qualities well reflected in his writing. Yet unlike, say, the case with
a Civil War historian, the fact that there was at least some overlap in our lives
(I was thirteen when Fuchida died in 1976) means that my fantasizing about
knowing Fuchida is perhaps not completely far-fetched. So, while I am sure I
would have asked him some rather pointed questions while hoisting that beer, I
am equally certain that I would have had a wonderful time and would have been
personally enriched by meeting him.
Sadly, however, this article has less to do with beer than with the use of per-
sonal accounts in the study of naval history, since it is doubtful that any one per-
son has had a more deleterious long-term impact on the study of the Pacific War
than Mitsuo Fuchida. Because of his misstatements,
the American study of the Japanese side of such bat-
tles as Pearl Harbor and Midway (particularly the lat-
ter) was probably set back by decades. His untruths
also demonstrate the tremendous power of self-
serving ideas that may be wrong, but subtly support
national self-images, particularly when carried for-
ward by the mass media. This is a theme I will explore.
I hope it will be instructive to other historians.
Jon Parshall is the coauthor of Shattered Sword:
The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway and the
owner of a website on the Imperial Japanese Navy,
www.combinedfleet.com. Mr. Parshall has been pub-
lished in such periodicals as the U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, World War II, and this journal, and he
has made frequent television and guest lecture appear-
ances on the topic of the Imperial Navy in World War
II. He is also an adjunct lecturer for the Naval War Col-
lege. Mr. Parshall is currently in the software industry.
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It was during the research for our book Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of
the Battle of Midway that my coauthor, Anthony Tully, and I gradually became
aware of Fuchida’s half-truths. Our quest was not to discredit Fuchida or to ma-
lign any historian who used him as a source. Rather, we were motivated by curi-
osity, our great interest in the Japanese Imperial Navy, and our wish to learn the
truth. However, during the process of building a new foundation for our Mid-
way study, it became clear to us that an important part of the old foundation had
to be destroyed, for the simple reason that it was rotten. Things might have
ended there, had it not been for Fuchida’s other misstatements regarding Pearl
Harbor, as well as his later war activities. It was only in the past few years that I
became aware that Fuchida’s mistruths actually spanned the entire conflict.
Likewise, I have been constantly questioned in the course of giving presenta-
tions on Midway as to what Fuchida’s likely motivations were for his actions.
This has led to considerable ruminating, and not a little scratching of my balding
pate. This article will hopefully answer some of those questions.
The bottom line is that Fuchida was a complex individual with complex moti-
vations. What is clear is that his impact on the history of the Pacific War has been
enormously damaging, in that his elaborations have been parroted for years and
handed down as truth on the big screen, on television, and in countless Internet
chat rooms. What makes this even more surprising is that although Fuchida was
not a high-ranking officer, he created and influenced more of the postwar history
of the Pacific War than perhaps any admiral on either side of the conflict. Let us
turn to the three whoppers.
The first of Fuchida’s tall tales concerns the attack on Pearl Harbor, which
might be called “The Tale of the Missing Tank-Farm Attack.” Down through the
years, Western writers have duly noted that the Japanese navy let slip a poten-
tially crucial opportunity to cripple the U.S. fleet at the outset of hostilities. In
the months leading up to the war, the U.S. Navy carefully amassed 4.5 million
barrels of fuel oil at Pearl Harbor, reasoning correctly that it would be the life-
blood of any future naval war against Japan.1 The oil was stored at the base’s two
tank-farm complexes, primarily in aboveground tanks.
On the morning of 7 December, Japan’s carrier striking force, the Kidô Butai,
struck Pearl Harbor. In the course of their two attack waves, the Japanese accom-
plished two important goals. First, they crushed American land-based airpower,
destroying or damaging around 350 of the 400 American aircraft on Oahu. This
essentially eliminated the ability of the Americans to strike back effectively
against the Kidô Butai. Second, the Japanese sank or badly damaged the majority
of the American battleships in the harbor, thereby accomplishing (or so they
presumed) their overall goal of destroying the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s striking power.
Such a victory, it was felt, would give the Imperial Navy free rein in the Pacific to
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drive into the southern resource areas of Malaya, Borneo, and Java. Thereupon,
having accomplished these key goals, the Japanese task force came about and
headed home, ending the attack. However, the controversy over whether the
Japanese should have attempted a follow-up strike was already beginning.
As the overall tactical commander in the air, Mitsuo Fuchida loitered in the
area to assess the damage that his forces had caused. In Gordon Prange’s land-
mark At Dawn We Slept, Fuchida is quoted as making the claim that during his
return to the carrier Akagi he “mentally earmarked for destruction the fuel-tank
farms, the vast repair and maintenance facilities, and perhaps a ship or two
bypassed that morning for priority targets.”2 Upon landing, he allegedly
pressed vigorously for a follow-up attack aimed at these targets, becoming “bit-
ter and angry” when Admiral Chu- ichi Nagumo instead turned for home.3 This
same scene was mirrored in the movie Tora! Tora! Tora! thereby passing into the
American collective memory.4 In fact, it would appear that none of these events
ever took place.
H. P. Willmott and his coauthors Tohmatsu Haruo and W. Spencer Johnson
must be given credit for introducing these important clarifications into the
Western literature. They noted in 2001 that the targeting priorities for the at-
tack were as follows: land-based airpower; aircraft carriers; battleships, cruis-
ers, and other warships; merchant shipping; port facilities; and land
installations.5 In other words, fuel tanks were at the very bottom of the list, and
during the first two attack waves the Japanese had barely begun chewing their
way into item number three on that list.
Despite postwar American incredulity, these targeting priorities made
perfect sense in the context of the ultra-Mahanian Japanese fleet. Enemy
combat assets were axiomatically more important than the logistical apparatus
supporting those assets. Sea control devolved from sinking warships, not blow-
ing up fuel tanks. While it is true that the Japanese were perhaps shortsighted in
not having gauged the value of Pearl Harbor’s fuel tanks and logistical facilities,
they were also fighting a deliberately shortsighted war. If they could not bring
the United States to the bargaining table in 1942, they were going to lose the war
regardless. Yet there is little in the historical record on the American side to sug-
gest that the immolation of Pearl’s fuel stocks would have made the United
States any more willing to bargain with the Japanese in the short term—the very
nature of the initial assault precluded negotiation. All in all, it is clear that if a
follow-on attack had been launched by the Japanese, it almost certainly would
have been aimed at the large numbers of American cruisers, destroyers, and sub-
marines left in the harbor.
With respect to Fuchida’s tale, Willmott correctly points out, there was, first
of all, no independent confirmation of Fuchida’s claim that he had “earmarked”
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logistical targets. Indeed, had he actually done so, this would have represented a
complete renunciation of all his prior naval training and indoctrination. Second,
Admiral Ryu-mosuke Kusaka (Admiral Nagumo’s chief of staff) made no men-
tion of Fuchida’s protestations in his own postwar account.6 Instead, Kusaka
states that Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s alleged unhappiness over the result of
the attacks, as well as condemnations from others regarding the failure to attack
cruisers, other vessels, and the base’s fuel tanks, were all criticisms heard later,
nothing more than “afterthoughts of poor strategists.”7 Third, Commander
Minoru Genda, the First Air Fleet’s staff air officer, acknowledged in his own
memoirs that he was aware of the Tora! Tora! Tora! scene but explicitly denied
that such an incident had actually taken place or that any such proposal had been
put forward by Fuchida.8 Finally, Willmott notes that Fuchida had been interro-
gated in 1945 by the Americans and had been asked point-blank why there had
been no follow-up attack at Pearl Harbor. Fuchida responded that at the time the
extent of the degradation of American airpower on Oahu was unknown (and
hence the potential threat to Japan’s carriers was unknown) and that the de-
struction or damage to eight American battleships constituted success, as far as
Combined Fleet was concerned. He made no mention of the fuel tanks.9 Yet in
1963 he delivered an account to Prange that made himself appear a great deal
more prescient than he apparently had been willing to reveal in 1945.
Interestingly, Fuchida’s story continued morphing even after 1963. I was
amused recently by a posting to an Internet group dedicated to the study of the
battle of Midway. One of the group’s members, a gentleman who knew many
Midway participants personally, commented on the tank-farm oversight at Pearl
Harbor as follows: “Over the years I got to know a retired captain who was
aboard the USS Enterprise shortly after Midway. In his retirement years he be-
came well acquainted with Reverend Fuchida. [Fuchida had become a Christian
evangelist after the war.] [He] spent many hours with [Fuchida] and learned a
lot that few were privileged to know. One of the things [he] learned is that the
Japanese did not bomb the oil tanks because they planned to use them after they
invaded Oahu.”10
This is not the first time I have run across this particular spin on the oil tanks,
and it is a truly incredible misstatement on Fuchida’s part. John Stephan’s well
researched Hawaii under the Rising Sun makes it clear that during the decades
leading up to the war the Japanese had intermittently mulled the notion of cap-
turing Hawaii in the event of war. It is equally clear, though, that there were no
concrete plans to this effect at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Such oper-
ations had been discussed during planning for the attack but rejected by
Yamamoto as too risky.11 It is unlikely that the Imperial Army would have agreed
to such a gambit in any case, given its general disinclination for operations
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outside of China and its keen awareness of the lack of available assault shipping.
Finally, of course, even if there had been such plans on the grand strategic level, a
mere air group commander like Fuchida almost certainly would not have been
privy to their details on 7 December. Yet Fuchida’s “privileged” statements to
this retired American captain played nicely to the whole American psychology
relating to this battle.
Being on the receiving end of extremely nasty surprises is the nature of war.
Sometimes, though, the enemy overlooks a temporary weakness and does not
inflict quite as awful a beating as it could have. Such was the case with the tank
farms at Pearl. In such cases it is tempting—after the fact, and when the war is
safely won—to call the enemy stupid for having overlooked the obvious. Had
the Japanese actually attacked and destroyed these facilities, the more pointed
question would have been why the tanks were devoid of antiaircraft defenses,
nonhardened, and relatively undispersed? While many postwar commentators
would have us believe that these tanks were the very key to victory or defeat in
the Pacific, apparently no one on the American side recognized that fact before
the attack either. Yet Fuchida provided his listeners with a plausible lie that made
U.S. oversights seem unimportant while simultaneously making himself appear
smarter and more privy to inside knowledge of Japanese strategic deliberations
than he actually was.
Regarding the treatment of source material, Fuchida’s first whopper illus-
trates an important point that my coauthor, Anthony Tully, has repeatedly em-
phasized—witnesses’ first accounts are often their best accounts. These reports
tend to be terser, less embellished, and more to the point. This is especially im-
portant to note here because within the next decade the voices of most of the
World War II veterans, the men and women who have firsthand insight into that
incredible era, will be gone. It seems clear that Fuchida’s most reliable account
regarding Pearl Harbor was the first one he gave to his interrogators in 1945. In-
triguingly, the very mode of questioning used by them may well have given
Fuchida the clue that the fuel tanks were of larger interest to the Americans.
Certainly by 1963 his story had changed dramatically. Fuchida was never slow to
detect the sort of tales his audiences liked to hear.
The second whopper might be called “The Tale of the Fallacious Five Min-
utes,” as it has to do with the climactic American dive-bomber attack at Midway.
This stunning attack caught the Japanese completely by surprise, crippling three
of their four carriers and effectively deciding the battle in America’s favor. The
events leading up to this attack can be roughly summarized as follows. Prior to
the battle, the Kidô Butai had been instructed by Admiral Yamamoto to keep
half of its aircraft ready for an antiship strike in case an American fleet was
present in the area. Several hours into the proceedings on the morning of 4 June,
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however, Nagumo ordered those reserve aircraft rearmed with land-attack
weapons to deliver a second blow against Midway. Barely half an hour later, one
of the two American carrier task forces, under Admirals Frank Jack Fletcher and
Raymond Spruance, was detected, whereupon the Japanese reserve force’s arma-
ment was ordered switched back to antiship weapons. A series of American air
attacks then occurred, which were roughly handled but managed to keep the
Japanese off balance. By 1020 on the morning of 4 June, according to Fuchida,
the Japanese were finally ready to counterattack the Americans. A famous pas-
sage in Fuchida’s Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan, entitled “A Fateful
Five Minutes,” describes the scene as follows:
One after another, planes were hoisted from the hangar and quickly arranged on the
flight deck. There was no time to lose. At 1020 Admiral Nagumo gave the order to
launch when ready. On Akagi’s flight deck all planes were in position with engines
warming up. The big ship began turning into the wind. Within five minutes, all her
planes would be launched. Five minutes! Who would have dreamed that the tide of
battle would shift completely in that interval of time? . . . At 1024 the order to start
launching came from the bridge by voicetube . . . and the first Zero fighter gathered
speed and whizzed off the deck. At that instant a lookout screamed: “Hell-divers!” I
looked up to see three black enemy planes plummeting toward our ship.12
This rendition of events—wherein Japanese carriers, their flight decks
packed with attack aircraft just moments from takeoff, are caught at the last sec-
ond and destroyed—has been echoed in every Western account of the battle
since 1955, when Fuchida’s book was first published in the United States. It is
part of the common psyche concerning Midway, creating a mental image for
every American who has ever studied the battle. Unfortunately, it is a mental im-
age that is incorrect.
During the course of the morning’s operations the Japanese carriers came
under attack no fewer than five times by nine separate groups of American
aircraft. Not surprisingly, Japanese flight decks were quite busy with combat
air patrol (CAP) requirements. These activities, as well as the interspersed
American attacks, made it nearly impossible for the reserve strike force to be
readied on the Japanese flight decks—a process that took around forty-five min-
utes.13 It was not until the publication of Shattered Sword that all these factors
were brought together. In the course of our research, Tully and I were able to use
the Japanese air group records for the carriers to show that the Japanese had
been recovering CAP fighters aboard Akagi a mere fifteen minutes before it was
bombed.14 Recovering aircraft meant that its flight deck had to be empty aft,
which in turn meant that there was no reserve strike force spotted. The official
Japanese war history on the battle, Senshi So-sho, explicitly states that at the time
of the American attack there were no attack aircraft on the Japanese flight decks,
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only combat air patrol fighters. Indeed, the Zero fighter whizzing off Akagi’s
flight deck in Fuchida’s dramatic passage can be shown in Akagi’s own air group
records to have been a CAP fighter, sent aloft to foil the ongoing American air at-
tacks. We even know the pilot’s name.15
Thus, Fuchida’s entire rendition of the climax of the most important naval bat-
tle in American history was a lie. The Japanese were nowhere near ready to coun-
terattack at this time. The truly stunning thing about this, however, is that it
essentially paralyzed the American study of this pivotal battle for the better part of
fifty years. Fuchida’s tale was in English, while the operational records that belied
it were in handwritten Japanese stored on microfilms. For this reason, American
historians (perhaps not surprisingly) simply accepted Fuchida’s account verbatim
and declined to look further. It did not help matters that Fuchida had become
great friends with Gordon Prange, whose best-selling Miracle at Midway (1983)
became, hands down, the most important English-language account of the battle,
one whose details were subsequently incorporated into many other Western
histories. Intriguingly, Fuchida’s reputation as a reliable witness was demolished
in Japan as soon as the Senshi So-sho volume on the battle came out in 1971. Again,
because of the difficulty of the source materials, most American historians were
not even aware of the value of Senshi So-sho, let alone what it said about Midway in
particular, until around the turn of the twenty-first century.
I am convinced that one reason why Fuchida’s tale endured in American liter-
ature is that it tapped into an underlying national self-image that we Americans
have of the battle. Americans have always identified with tales of plucky under-
dogs prevailing against the odds. The story that Fuchida fed us was oriented
along those lines. With such a “reliable” witness providing ready-made images
for any screenplay, why would anyone think to look further into the (incredibly
difficult and tedious) Japanese sources? At the same time, Fuchida subtly shifted
the causes for Japan’s defeat away from individuals and more toward what might
be termed a “fates of war” explanation, which is more acceptable to Japanese
societal sensibilities. This made sense in a book written immediately after the
conflict by a former Japanese naval officer trying to salvage some honor from the
wreckage of both a career and a lost war. Indeed, Fuchida’s motivations were
probably along the same lines as those of individuals like Major General F. W.
von Mellenthin, whose famous book Panzer Battles (1956), along with memoirs
by other former Wehrmacht commanders, not only helped orient the terms of
study of the eastern front along essentially German lines for the better part of
fifty years but also implanted the myth of outsized German martial prowess that
reverberates in some audiences to this day.
Fuchida’s second whopper illustrates an important point in the use of
sources—that operational records (dull as they are) form the bedrock of any
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military historical account and must be given weight at least equal to that given
individual observations. If individual observations provide the narrative mate-
rial, operational records should provide the foundation for understanding the
larger picture into which the narrative must fit. Had American historians had
the good sense to use the Japanese operational records that were available to
them as early as the 1960s, Fuchida’s tales would never have been as pervasively
accepted. Instead, his word was accepted essentially as holy writ until 2005.
Fuchida’s third whopper is “The Tale of the Privileged Observer.” In some
ways it is the most egregious of the three, because unlike his tales from the Kidô
Butai there were literally thousands of potential American witnesses to this par-
ticular story, who might have come forward to debunk it. Yet this particular
whopper was the last of the three to be uncovered, having been exposed only in
2009. In 2008 I was a consultant to a writer working on a screenplay for a motion
picture, a major portion of which deals with the life of Fuchida and his postwar
conversion to Christianity. As part of that effort, I came across Fuchida’s claim,
made in Prange’s God’s Samurai, that he had attended the surrender ceremony in
Tokyo Bay aboard the USS Missouri.16 This statement triggered my by-now
finely honed Fuchida radar. Why, I asked myself, would Fuchida have been
aboard the Missouri? What possible business did he have there?
Fuchida’s explanation was that he had been in charge of arranging transpor-
tation for the Japanese surrender delegation and had then been allowed to come
aboard with a group of Japanese army and navy liaison officers to observe the
proceedings from a perch in Missouri’s superstructure. This flew in the face of
common sense. The photographic evidence of the ceremony makes two things
quite clear. First, except for the honored Allied dignitaries whose direct partici-
pation was required, this was an almost exclusively U.S. Navy affair. Second, it
was standing room only, with Missouri’s sailors jammed into every available
space to observe the proceedings. What possible motivation would any American
sailor have had to offer up his perch on this grand event (one that he had left
home and family for to fight for months or years) to some unknown Japanese
officer who happened to show up at the last minute? Likewise, why would any-
one have allowed someone like Fuchida, presumably in the company of other
Japanese military officers, to wander into the command spaces of the flagship of
the U.S. fleet? If he was there, why were there no photographs of him or the rest
of the liaison party, when we have numerous photographs of the surrender dele-
gation coming aboard? The more I thought about it, the more I came to believe
that no other Japanese besides the surrender delegation could have been there.
However, it turns out I was wrong. While looking over some of the photo-
graphs of the event, an image surfaced of someone who was clearly a Japanese
male, dressed in tropical military garb and sporting a camera, who was not a
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member of the surrender delegation. The acquaintance who uncovered this image
argued that since we now had photos of at least one Japanese outside the delega-
tion, perhaps Fuchida could have been there as well. This, in turn, raised the ugly
prospect of having to try to identify every face in every photograph of the cere-
mony to prove that Fuchida was not there, when in all fairness the onus should
have been on Fuchida to prove his rather incredible attendance claim.
Salvation in this case was provided by Martin Bennett, the screenwriter, who
very sensibly wrote to the Battleship Missouri Memorial on the matter. Michael
Weidenbach, the museum’s curator, returned the following testament of the
Missouri’s commander, Stuart Murray, that not only verified Fuchida’s absence
but also provided the identity of the unknown Japanese in the photographs.
Captain Murray noted,
The Japanese were allowed to have a newsreel photographer. My recollection is only
one, but there might have been two. But my orders since they only had the limited
number, he was assigned a position on the 40mm gun platform on the starboard
wing of the verandah deck [sic]. Two Marines had been assigned him to keep an eye
on him because I felt there was a possibility he might try to pull a fancy trick with his
camera or something and be a hero or a kamikaze by taking with him some of the
central people. So these two Marines each had a hand on his leg and put him in his
place and told him to stay there. . . . [T]hey had their other hand on the butt of their
Colt .45. . . . [T]here was no question that [he] got the word.17
Captain Murray’s account also makes it clear that security aboard the
ship—even for Allied guests—was very tight, reflecting (in the words of histo-
rian Alan Zimm) the Navy’s “corporate culture” for handling such events, which
emphasizes positive control and overorganization.18 Indeed, during the cere-
mony itself, a Russian photographer who tried moving to a different position in
order to get a better view was physically tackled by one of the Marine guards and
escorted back to his appointed spot.19 As Weidenbach pointed out, if Fuchida
had been aboard the Missouri in any capacity whatsoever, “his presence would
have been noted, and his placement would have been noted in the official
records . . . and would have been strictly monitored and recorded.”20
The lesson from the third whopper is yet another reminder (if any were
needed) that proving a negative is oftentimes a lot harder than proving a posi-
tive. However, it is the historian’s job to produce positive evidence to support the
claims that are made by the participants in our narratives. In this case, the onus
was on Fuchida to support his rather incredible claims. His story, while superfi-
cially plausible, failed when subjected to the weight of the other positive evi-
dence we have on this highly documented ceremony. Despite the presence of
literally thousands of Americans who might have seen him, photographed him,
or recalled his presence, we still have nothing more than his word that he was
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there. Thus, by any reasonable measure of proof, Fuchida was not aboard the
USS Missouri for the ceremony.
The reader would be right to ask at this point: Why did Fuchida make this stuff
up? What was the motivation? Here we must set aside strictly objective historical
enquiry and venture into amateur psychology (a prospect that always makes me
queasy). However, as someone who has “lived with” Fuchida now for a number
of years I would make the following observations. A glimpse into the inner char-
acter of the man is revealed in the movie Tora! Tora! Tora! for which both Prange
and Fuchida were technical advisers. During one scene, near the beginning of
the movie, Fuchida lands his plane on the carrier Akagi. Dismounting, he is im-
mediately surrounded by other aviators. Fuchida tells them they’d better treat
him well, because he is their new air group commander. Surprised by this news,
one of the pilots asks how he rated another promotion. Fuchida responds, to the
general hilarity of all assembled, “Well, exceptional people get exceptional treat-
ment!” I believe this illustrates something central about the man. Fuchida con-
sidered himself exceptional. Above all else, he wanted to be perceived as being
intelligent and insightful, and if that meant depicting himself as armed with
wisdom that could only have been developed in hindsight, so be it.
After the war, Fuchida enjoyed the company of Americans, attending many
Pearl Harbor and Midway events. Indeed, Fuchida may have been more popular
in America than in Japan. Furthermore, by his conversion to Christianity and
ordination, Fuchida was vested with the aura that we typically confer on all
clergy. We are taught in Sunday school that priests do not lie, that their quests for
higher truths compel them to convey mortal truths faithfully as well. These
societal beliefs are particularly in evidence with members of the war generation.
I have been called to task more than once by World War II veterans who express
incredulity that a man of the cloth like Fuchida could have lied about his war-
time experiences, despite the many sordid modern examples we have of clerical
misadventures. Furthermore, in the eyes of veterans, Fuchida, despite being an
enemy during the war years, was still (as Bill Mauldin put it) a member of “The
Benevolent and Protective Brotherhood of Them What Has Been Shot At,”
whereas historians of the postwar era are decidedly not.21 Such beliefs are diffi-
cult to overturn.
Fuchida was hardly alone in having falsified the record, of course. Veterans of
every war, either intentionally or unintentionally, have misrepresented the
events they participated in, until the very term “war story” is interchangeable
with a tale of dubious veracity. Any military historian who has interviewed
veterans has learned to be cautious in accepting their narratives. Time, distance,
and the stress of combat can all distort a participant’s recollection of events,
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even setting aside the possibility of intentional misstatements. However, it is not
often that a veteran has the chance to distort the history of the two most impor-
tant battles of the Pacific War, throwing in the surrender ceremony for good
measure. Nor do many veterans get to see their personal versions of history
enshrined in not one but two major motion pictures (Tora! Tora! Tora! and Midway),
thereby ensuring that their distortions will be incorporated into the common
wisdom of the most important conflict of the twentieth century. In this sense
Fuchida was unique and his impact absolutely unprecedented.
How can historians prevent this? The great French historian Marc Bloch
wrote in The Historian’s Craft that “from the moment when we are no longer
resigned to purely and simply recording the words of our witnesses . . . cross-
examination becomes more necessary than ever. Indeed, it is the prime neces-
sity of well-conducted historical research.”22 Fuchida’s fables are a reminder of
what happens when this sort of basic “blocking and tackling” is neglected.
Yet additional narrative accounts are not necessarily required for this cross-
examination. In the case of Midway, it was not another person calling our atten-
tion to Fuchida’s “fateful five minutes” invention by giving a contradicting
report but rather ships’ flight records, as well as a sufficiently detailed under-
standing of how Japanese flight deck operations were conducted, that led to the
inevitable conclusion that Fuchida had not told the truth. Ships’ logs, technical
plans and diagrams, maps and geographic-information databases, weather re-
ports, photographs, radio intercepts, personnel records, and military doctrinal
tracts—all of these and more are sources that can be used to augment (and
cross-check) narrative sources. The key to combating overreliance on a single
source remains, as ever, the development of a portfolio of varied sources that can
be compared to each other.
It is unlikely that Fuchida’s legacy will be overturned any time soon, perhaps
not even within my lifetime. Yet as Bloch said, “The knowledge of the past is
something progressive which is constantly transforming and perfecting it-
self.”23 Therein lies the promise of a brighter future. The fundamental goal of
history rightly remains not the discrediting of Fuchida but rather the perfec-
tion of our collective knowledge about the events he witnessed. Pearl Harbor
and Midway still deserve study and will receive the attention they rightly de-
serve. That attention, however, will be increasingly directed via an array of
methodologies and sources, not just a simplistic compilation of narrative ac-
counts whose wellspring is now quickly running dry. The legacy of this most
profound and complex of wars deserves no less sophisticated and holistic a his-
torical approach.
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